1. The raid on Surprise Hill, 10/11th December 1899

On the night of 10th December 1899 the 2nd Battalion of the
Rifle Brigade launched an attack on a troublesome Boer gun on Surprise Hill, to
the north of Ladysmith. This followed a successful foray by the Colonial
troops, the Imperial Light Horse, Natal Carbineers and the Border Mounted
Rifles on three Boer guns on Gun Hill three nights previously.

2. Original Rifle Brigade monument

Some time after Ladysmith was relieved, the Rifle Brigade erected a monument at the foot of
Surprise Hill to commemorate their feat, inscribed with the names of those who
were killed and buried nearby in a mass grave. Lieutenant Gilbert Ferguson’s
name is included even though his body was taken into Ladysmith for burial in
the Borough cemetery. Some years ago the monument was vandalised by people
digging for artefacts. It collapsed into a heap of stones. Only later was the
white marble plaque with the names of those Riflemen who died in the attack,
smashed into fragments.

3. The rebuilt monuments

In 2009 the monument was rebuilt. Jan Human, on whose farm the monument is sited, and Eugene Campher,
who is passionate about anything connected with Ladysmith’s history, worked for some years to achieve this result.

4. The Rifle Brigade Monument

The Rifle Brigade monument has been reconstructed to be as close as possible to its original shape and size. A new marble plaque has been made which includes the names of all those killed in the raid.

5. The original plaque

The fragments of the original plaque have been cemented into the rear of the cairn.

6. The Boer monument

The Boer dead of the engagement
needed to be commemorated as well. A column alongside the Rifle Brigade cairn
gives their names, including the name of the first Jewish man on the Boer side
to be killed in the Anglo Boer war.

7. Marble plaque with the Boer names.

The Boer names.

8. Harry Spanier

The plaque for the first Jewish fatality of the Anglo Boer war on the Boer side.

9. Tin Town cemetery

Those buried at the foot of Surprise Hill were reinterred at Tin Town cemetery but only recently was a plaque with their names placed there.

10. Rededication ceremony

The monument was rededicated in a ceremony attended by about 200 people on 11th December 2009.

11. The march to Ladysmith from Dundee

In 1899 the Colony of Natal’s borders were very different from the provincial borders of today. The districts of Vryheid and Utrecht, which had constituted the New Republic, merged with the Transvaal in 1881 which became the South African Republic. These borders meant that the defence of the northern portion of Natal was problematic.
Newcastle and the territory north of Dundee could easily be cut off by Boer forces advancing from the Orange Free State to the west and the Transvaal to the east. In Dundee, Major General Sir Willam Penn Symons, boasting that he had no plan for the defence of Dundee, made no attempt to fortify the town. A frontal attack on the Boers who occupied Talana Hill in the early morning of 20th October 1899 was successful. The Boers retreated but Penn Symons was mortally wounded and his force suffered 500 casualties, most of them wounded or captured.
The remaining 4000 artillery, cavalry and infantry had no alternative but to retire back into Ladysmith. The march took three days, not a man was lost, and these men were a welcome reinforcement for Lieutenant General Sir George White’s Ladysmith garrison. Even more valuable were the 18 guns that came too.

12. Sir George White, VC

Ladysmith was cut off and surrounded by the Boer armies of the South African Republic of the Transvaal and that of the Orange Free State on 2nd November 1899. Sir George White, the British commander of the Natal Field Force, had resolved to deny this important strategic town and rail junction to the Boers. His report stated: It may be well to state here shortly the reasons which governed my choice of this position. Ladysmith is the most important town in Northern Natal, and there was reason to believe that the enemy attached very great and perhaps even undue importance to obtaining possession of it. Strategically the town was important as being the junction of the railways which enter Natal from the Transvaal and the Orange Free State...

13. Commandant General Petrus Joubert

The Commandant General Petrus Johannes Joubert held a paid position and was in effect a professional soldier. His salary was the not inconsiderable sum of £2500 per annum. It was an elected office that he had first secured in 1880. He was a popular man and a wealthy one. He might be said to have been an experienced soldier, for the Boer republics had been in almost constant conflict with their native inhabitants since their founding. As Commandant General he was nominally in command of all the Boer forces, both Transvaal and Orange Free State.

14. Mournful Monday

There was huge enthusiasm when Joubert announced to the assembled commandos at Sandspruit that the Boer republics were in a state of war with Great Britain. He had arrived there on a special train and the British journalist H.W. Nevinson wrote: At Zandspruit the whole Boer camp crowded to the station to greet the national hero, and he was at once surrounded by a herd of farmers, shaking his hands and patting him warmly on the back. It was a
respectful but democratic greeting. Joubert’s advance into the Colony of Natal commenced on 11th October. The Boers moved slowly and cautiously. Newcastle, undefended by the British, was occupied only on the 14th
and it took another five days before they reached the outskirts of Dundee. Although they suffered setbacks at Talana and Elandslaagte, Joubert’s men pressed forward and the battle outside Ladysmith on Monday 30th October 1899
restored the Boer morale and confidence.

15. Boer bombardment

Every part of the town was soon within range of Boer artillery. It took several days before the Boer guns were in place. On 7th November the bombardment started in earnest, although Boer shells had been falling in the town since the 2nd. Apart from moving some of their lighter guns from hill to hill, the Boer gunnery did not seem well organized or coordinated. Their citizen army was loath to accept the inevitable casualties that would have been the result of an
attempt to storm the defences. Thus the alternative was to batter their enemy into submission with constant artillery bombardment. Short of ammunition, the British could reply only occasionally, not knowing when their resupply would reach them. George Steevens, of the Daily Mail wrote that “the Boers made war like gentlemen of leisure” and “the casualties in Ladysmith during a fortnight were one white civilian, two natives, a horse, two mules, a waggon, and about half-a-dozen houses.”

16. King's Post

That there were not more casualties was the result of the civilian population digging themselves into shelters and caves along the high banks of the Klip River. The soldiers dug trenches and built sangars and were sheltered behind stone walls. The 2nd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade on King’s Post, in an exposed position and vulnerable to artillery fire from the hills to the west, north and south, built bomb-proof shelters and covered pits against shrapnel. Nevertheless, they had to seek rapid shelter when a shell was fired.

17. The capture of Winston Churchill

Although he held the rank of Commandant General, Joubert did not have the authority, under the commando law of the Transvaal, to simply order an attack on the British defences. This could only be done after a krygsraad. On 8th November such a meeting was held and agreement was reached for a policy of active offence. Attacks were to be launched the following day with the object of capturing and occupying the Platrand, with a diversionary attack on Observation Hill on the opposite side of the town. Poorly coordinated with the artillery bombardment, the attacks were easily beaten off. Deneys Reitz described it as a “typical piece of bungling”. The following day the Transvaal Boer officers assembled in the main laager to hear Joubert express the opinion that he considered it doubtful that Ladysmith could be taken by storm. It was therefore resolved to send a commando, 2,500 strong, southwards to destroy the railway lines and so prevent the enemy from sending reinforcements to Ladysmith. Orange Free State Chief Commandant Marthinus Prinsloo was not enthusiastic about this plan but nevertheless reluctantly agreed to allow only 500 of his men, instead of the requested 1,000, to join the raid. The Boer horses needed rest and the expedition left Ladysmith only on 13th November with just 1,500 riders. Attacking and capturing an armoured train (and a young journalist named Winston Churchill) on 15th November encouraged them to proceed further. After an indecisive clash with a British force at Willow Grange, outside Estcourt, a decision had to be made about whether to return back over the Tugela River or make a further advance.
The mandatory krygsraad decided to
return. Joubert had fallen from his horse and suffered severe bruising. In pain
from the internal injuries he went by train to Volksrust for treatment.

18. Transport of Boer heavy guns

In 1897 the government of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) purchased four 155mm siege guns made in the Schneider factory in the town of le Creusot, France – three of these were sent to Ladysmith. These were in addition to four 12cm Krupp howitzers imported in 1896. TheCreusots became known to the British as “Long Toms”. They had been extremely sceptical about the possibility of this ordnance being used in field service. Their appearance outside Dundee and then Ladysmith was a rude awakening for the British. The Boers had a Long Tom, a 12cm (4.7
inch) Krupp howitzer and a Maxim machine gun on Gun Hill due east of Ladysmith. These were the closest guns to Ladysmith, together with another Krupp howitzer on Surprise Hill to the north.

19. Krupp howitzer

A Krupp 12cm howitzer weighed close to a ton and was drawn by a team of twelve mules. To succeed in dragging it up the reverse slope of Surprise Hill was a considerable feat. The reverse slope of the hill is considerably less steep than the front but nevertheless it took considerable resource and ingenuity to get it up onto the fairly flat but very rocky summit. It was done without the British realising, until it opened fire, that there was even a gun on Surprise Hill. Several redoubts were built out of the rock existing on the hilltop and the gun may have fired from at least two positions. The provision of ammunition was a serious difficulty. Each round weighed 35 pounds and would have to be brought from Modderspruit Station and carried up to the hilltop. Possibly local black people were employed for this laborious task. This clearly explains why the gun fired only intermittently even though it could easily hit any target in Ladysmith.

20. Deneys Reitz and Dietlof van Warmelo

Once the Boers settled down to besiege the town “all talk of the bananas we were to eat in the south of Natal came to an end” said Dietlof van Warmelo. Reitz and his brother seemed happy enough with the routine of camp life: "My
brother and I settled down to a life of ease, spending our time in sniping at the English outposts, or in riding to neighbouring laagers. Camp life was a pleasant existence. There were no drills or parades and, except for night
picket and an occasional fatigue-party to the railway depot to fetch supplies, there were no military duties." Dietlof
van Warmelo, on the other hand, told a different story: "The months spent near Ladysmith were to most of us the most tedious of the whole war. We had so little to do, and the heat between the glowing rocks of the kopjes was awful. The little work we had was anything but pleasant; it consisted chiefly in keeping guard either by day or
by night. In the beginning a very bad watch was kept. Later on we had to climb the kopje at least every alternate evening to pass the long nights in our positions, while not far behind us stood our empty tents."

21. The besiegers

With little now to occupy them, it is not surprising that the Boers now looked to their comforts. Joubert had insisted on only one wagon for every twenty-five or fifty Boers. The Commandant General however was no longer present in Ladysmith and General Schalk Burger, the Transvaal Vice President, had taken his place. By the end of November there were numbers of tented wagons drawn up into laagers around the Boer encampments. A number of the Boer wives followed and a sort of picnic atmosphere reigned.

22. Boer picnic

The fact that the British had made no attempt to attack any of these laagers gave the Boers a false sense of security and by early December sentries and picquets would usually lie and sleep rather than keep watch. Reitz wrote in Commando: During the daytime no guards were set at all, as there were always a sufficient number of men on the hill above amusing themselves with sniping to make sure of an alarm being given. At night, although we went on outpost so close to the English sentries that we could hear them challenge each other, we did not take our watches very seriously. We used to go out on foot after dark in parties of twenty or so, and, on reaching neutral ground on the plain between ourselves and the enemy-line, two men at a time would walk forward a short distance. Here they stood or sat on sentry-go while the rest of us pulled off our boots, spread out blankets and went to sleep.

23. Colonel the Compte Georges de Villebois-Mareuil

On 6th December a French soldier arrived at Modderspruit, Colonel the Compte Georges de Villebois-Mareuil. De Villebois was met by Captain “Sam” Léon, the French engineer who was building firing platforms for the Creusot Long Toms around Ladysmith. They lunched alongside the railway track. The Frenchmen climbed Gun Hill to inspect the gun position. De Villebois was not happy with what he found there. Without authority, the Boer artillerists could only listen to him politely. There were no supports for the gun crew and there were no outposts to give advance warning of an attack. Nothing was done about de Villebois’s warning.

24. Lieutenant General Sir George White and staff

White had resolved to await relief by General Redvers Buller’s army assembling to the south of the Tugela. Reinforcements were arriving from England and there were ample supplies of food, ammunition and forage for the animals inside Ladysmith. He did not expect to be shut up in Ladysmith for more than a month, or perhaps two at the most. White had brought with him two trusted staff officers, Colonel Ian Hamilton and Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry Rawlinson. Already present in Natal was Major General Archibald Hunter, sent from India to be Chief of Staff to General Sir Redvers Buller. As Buller had not yet arrived in South Africa, Hunter was ordered to attach himself to White for the time being. Also in this picture is Major David Henderson, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General for
Intelligence

25. Hunter and Rawlinson

White at first was dead set against any actions involving raids outside the defence lines against the Boer besiegers. A number of British officers advocated aggressive action against Boer gun positions, Hunter and Rawlinson being prime movers in this regard. According to Captain Johnny Gough of the Rifle Brigade, “Hunter was full of wild schemes” and Rawlinson proposed an attack on “Bulwana Tom” (the Boer Creusot gun) as early as 11th November.

26. The British High Commissioner, Lord Milner

The many refugees inside Ladysmith were equally dissatisfied with White’s inaction. The British High Commissioner, Lord Milner, had promised to defend Natal “with the whole might of the Empire” but at that time the Empire’s whole might was still on the high seas.

27. George Willis

The refugees had exchanged their homes and property for the doubtful safety and protection of Ladysmith and felt bitter resentment towards the authorities as a result. The owner of the land on which Bulwana was situated was a man called George Willis, the mayor Ladysmith in 1899. From his dugout in the bank of the Klip River, where he and his large family were now lodged, he could plainly see Bulwana and the Boer guns on its flat summit. In early December he approached White’s staff and strongly advocated a raid to silence the Long Tom on the hill. White’s
response could only have been negative. A few nights later a letter appeared in the town accusing General White of cowardice. Willis was not to know that in fact plans were being made to attack certain of the Boer gun positions.

28. Captain Johnny Gough

On the night of 5th December, Captain Johnny Gough of the Rifle Brigade made a raid on Thornhill’s farm outside the lines. Each night Boer sharpshooters had occupied the farmhouse but this night it was deserted. Gough used two local men as guides, Harry Thornhill and Sydney Ashby.

29. Johnny Gough's Raid

Gough’s diary entry reads: “Got leave last night to try my scheme on Thornhill’s farm. I had 2 Coys i.e. 6 officers and 177 men. It was raining and a pitch black night. Everything went off splendidly and we completely surrounded the building ½Coy going as far as the railway. I then searched the houses but found there was no-one there. Cruel hard luck as all my plans worked out splendidly. Better luck next time.Reached the camp at 4.15 a.m., on the way back we looted some vegetables. I am certain if any Boers had been there that I would have bagged the lot – the farm is about 1½ miles out.”

30. Major David Henderson and the Guides

White was still reluctant to authorise a sortie outside the lines. Major David Henderson, DAAG of Intelligence, commanding officer of the corps of Natal Guides, was aware of the slackness of the Boer’s nightly watch-keeping. He proposed to White that 50 of his guides attack the Free Stater’s gun on Thornhill’s Kop and at first obtained permission to do so. However, the Long Tom on Gun Hill was more troublesome to Colonel William Knox’s sector of the defences and the Krupp howitzer on Surprise Hill also needed to be dealt with. Henderson’s order was countermanded and Hunter proposed to White that the Long Tom on Gun Hill be the first target.

31. Gun Hill

Rawlinson claimed that Hunter “and David Henderson persuaded the Chief to agree to my plan for having a go at Bulwana Tom. I was very sick at not being allowed to go myself, as it was my idea”. White insisted that Hunter lead the raid on Gun Hill himself, taking with him a force of 500 men. The result, on the night of 7th December 1899, was a stunning success for the men of the Imperial Light Horse, the Natal Carbineers and the Border Mounted Rifles. A Creusot Long Tom and a 12cm Krupp howitzer were blown up.

32. Long Tom breech block

The Imperial Light Horsemen carried the breech block of the Long Tom back to Ladysmith – it can still be seen in the Ladysmith Siege Museum.

33. General White praises the Colonial Regiments

General White was clearly delighted with the outcome and took the opportunity to express his pleasure by visiting the camps of the units who took part. With this tactic proven to be successful, White now ordered a further raid, this time on Surprise Hill.

34. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Metcalfe

The commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Metcalfe, had joined the battalion in Crete in 1899. Metcalfe’s predecessor, Francis Howard, now Major General, commanded that sector of the defences that included King’s Post. He had been in the Sudan in 1898 together with Hunter and Rawlinson. The attack on Surprise Hill to destroy the Boer Krupp howitzer on its summit was planned by these four officers, all well-acquainted with one another.

35. Surprise Hill

This is Surprise Hill, a steep hill to the north west of Ladysmith. It had born the name of Mdaka (or Vaalkop in Afrikaans) until, to the surprise of the British, the Boers dragged their gun to the summit and opened fire. Henceforth the hill was called Surprise Hill. It was almost 3½ miles from King’s Post and rose 700 feet above the valley between Thornhill’s Kop and Bell’s Kop.

36. Gunners of the ZAR Staatsartillerie on Surprise Hill

Its flat summit was a superb position for one of the best Boer artillery pieces, a 12cm Krupp howitzer. This gun outranged all of the British field guns in Ladysmith, except for their 4.7 inch Naval gun for which there was very little ammunition.. It was mounted low on its carriage which had relatively small, sturdy wheels. Although intended as a siege weapon, the Boers managed to transport it easily over rough terrain. It was a quick-firing gun which used a brass cartridge case.

37. Lieutenant Hugh Dawnay and Major Francis Wing

On the night of 9th December, Metcalfe himself reconnoitred the ground in company with Lieutenant Hugh Dawnay, the Adjutant of the 2nd Battalion, and Major Francis Wing of the Royal Artillery. Wing knew the area as
he had been in Ladysmith with the pre-war garrison. Boer picquets did not discover this little foray.

38. Lt Col S.P.E. Trichardt and Gen Daniel Erasmus

After the Gun Hill attack, surprisingly, the Boers did not step up their watchfulness nor increase the number of men guarding their gun positions. Only on 10th December did Lieutenant Colonel S.P.E. Trichardt address a letter to General Daniel Erasmus remonstrating about the weak force guarding the howitzer on Vaalkop (Surprise Hill). He said that while there were 30 men in the guard detail, only 2 of them remained on guard while the rest went to sleep to the rear of the emplacement. Trichardt required Erasmus to urgently increase the guard to 50 so that at least 10 of these should remain awake and watchful. An extra picquet had been placed at the foot of Vaalkop under the command of Corporal Tossel, formerly a detective in the Z.A.R.P., but this was the only extra measure put in place by General Erasmus. It was too late – Metcalfe and his men were shortly to be on their way to attack the hill.

39. Corporal Frederick de Witt Tossel

Corporal Frederick de Witt Tossel was an interesting character. He arrived in Cape Town from Scotland in 1880 when he was 15 years of age. His real name was Llewellyn May. Tall and well-built, he became a security guard, at first in Cape Town docks and later in Kimberley. He taught himself Dutch and acquired a smattering of a number of the African languages. Wanting to advance his career, he went to Pretoria and quickly realized that his name might be a bar to joining the Z.A.R.P. He adopted the somewhat unusual name of Frederick de Witt Tossel and advanced
rapidly to the rank of Lieutenant and command of the Johannesburg detective department.

40. Lieutenant Tossel in London

He was a member of the ZAR delegation sent to London for the trial of the Jameson raiders. How he came to join the Pretoria Commando we have not been able to establish.

41. Colour Sergeant Jack Archer

There are several first-person accounts of what happened that night. Deneys Reitz wrote a short version in Commando. There is a much more detailed account in the diary that he wrote during his time in exile in Madagascar. This diary is now in the Oppenheimer’s Brenthurst Library in Johannesburg. Dietlof van Warmelo also
wrote about his experiences. Lieutenant Hugh Dawnay wrote a report entitled the Attack on Surprise Hill for the Rifle Brigade Chronicle of 1900. Colour Sergeant Jack Archer wrote a letter to his mother in the form of a diary and including a sketch of the action. This document is in the Liddel Hart Centre for Military Archives in London. Captain Johnny Gough and Major George Thesiger also wrote diary entries.

42. Jack Archer's map

This is the sketch map that Archer enclosed with the letter to his mother. At 9 p.m. on the night of 10th December the Rifle Brigade assembled at King’s Post. Rawlinson had gone up to King’s Post to see the show. Five companies ‘A’ ‘B’ ‘E’ ‘G’ ‘H’ and part of ‘C’ were told off for the attack, 558 officers and men, together with five men of the Royal
Artillery under Major Francis Wing and six sappers under Lieutenant Robert Digby Jones of the Royal Engineers. Their guides were Harry Thornhill, who owned the nearby farm, and Sydney Ashby who may have been employed at a farm in the vicinity.

43. Archer's map enhanced

There was an active Boer searchlight on Telegraph Hill as well as bright moonlight. The force marched slowly so as to avoid the searchlight and halted in dead ground when the moon broke through the clouds. They proceeded when cloud covered the moon once again. The railway line to Harrismith, which crossed the valley in front of their objective, was their first serious obstacle. There were barbed wire fences on each side which had to be cut and care was taken to do this as silently as possible. Half of ‘E’ company was left to guard the crossing. They advanced across the open and level ground between the railway and the hill and pushed on as fast as they could in the darkness. It was necessary to observe complete silence and Dawnay was concerned that they were walking into a trap as
“Bell’s and Thornhill’s kopjes loomed large and ominous on our flanks.” They reached the donga which runs across the valley and left the other half of ‘E’ company here.

44. Robin Smith's map of the attack

At the foot of Surprise Hill ‘B’ and ‘G’ companies formed outwards to try and prevent the Boers working round the flanks. Captain Johnny Gough and ‘A’ Company had been chosen to lead the attack. His company advanced straight up the hill but with a gap in their line in case the Boer gun should open fire. Clearly, the British believed their climb would be detected long before they reached the top. British army footwear from the Victorian era until 1958 was so-called ‘ammunition boots’ – BGS or Boots General Service. They were unlined ankle-boots with leather uppers and sides, iron heel-plate and toe-plate, and an iron-studded leather sole. They were designed to be hard-wearing and
long-lasting rather than comfortable. By the time they were half way up, any idea of not being heard seemed out of the question, as the noise of ammunition boots on the rocks, and the constant clatter of men slipping and stumbling sounded terrific to their ears. Only very near the top was there a challenge from a Boer sentry – “Wer da?” repeated twice and followed by a shot from his rifle. Metcalfe, as had been pre-arranged, shouted out “Fix bayonets!” and the
Riflemen gave wild cheer and charged over the crest.

45. Major George Thesiger's diary account

Thesiger’s ‘H’ company deployed on the left and right, arriving at the top in an excellent line. Thesiger said “It
wasn’t till we got within about ten yards of the top that we were discovered. We then fixed swords and charged. Johnny’s lot killed the man at the gun. My lot went half left and cleared out a ‘doss house’. The Boers ran and we carried on about 70 yards beyond the gun and then laid down and fired volleys.” Most of the Boer defenders on the hill had been asleep at the rear of the emplacement under a bucksail. They escaped in the darkness but, realizing that there was no further pursuit, found suitable places to open fire on the attackers.

46. Lieutenant Robert Digby Jones

The gun was not in the emplacement which caused a little stir with the attackers until it was discovered a few yards away covered by a tarpaulin. Lieutenant Digby-Jones (R.E) and Major Wing (R.A.) set to work to place gun cotton charges in the barrel. The charges laid, the attackers waited for the explosion but evidently the first fuse was faulty. A cry of "Digby-Jones! Digby-Jones!" was raised. A second fuse was laid and this time the gun exploded with a huge roar. A further charge with a long fuse was laid so as to explode when once the Boers had returned to the emplacement.

(Lieutenant Robert Digby Jones was killed in the Boer attack on the Platrand on 6th January 1900. For his defence of Wagon Point he was awarded the Victoria Cross.)

47. Ambush by the Pretoria Commando

The order to retire was given by Metcalfe and the retirement down the hill commenced. The men were in a jocular mood after what seemed to have been a totally successful exploit. Laughing and joking they made their way towards Ladysmith and the safety of their camp. The Boers had been completely outwitted and the “good old Rifle Brigade” had triumphed. In fact, the Boers had been aroused and numbers of them had taken positions from both sides and were waiting to open fire on the retiring British. Dawnay reported that they were about a third of the way down the hill when they were met by a withering fire. Orders were given not to return fire, and only to use the bayonet. Thesiger commented that they were in a pretty tight place and Johnny Gough was grazed by shrapnel from a shot fired by a Free State gunner on Telegraph Hill.

48. The Malherbe Corporalship of the Pretoria Commando

On picquet opposite Observation Hill that evening were the men of Isaac Malherbe’s corporalship of the Pretoria commando, among whose members was Deneys Reitz and his older brother, Joubert. The Isaac Malherbe Corporalship was comprised of twenty-five men and included the five Malherbe brothers. On 10th December a number of them had been sent to Modderspruit station to collect supplies and had not returned by the time their colleagues had left the laager. That night the rest set off to take up their usual position facing Observation Hill from where they were usually close enough to be able to hear the British sentries as they patrolled nearby. On the farm Eendvogel Vley a probable place where they “pulled off our boots, spread out blankets and went to sleep” has been located. The other Boer picquet, that under the command of Corporal Fred Tossel, was somewhere in the vicinity. Reitz says it was at the foot of Surprise Hill. It was later said that they spotted the Riflemen but crept away without
giving the alarm. For a stretch of nearly three miles, there were thus only three pickets, roughly seventy-five
men, of whom only six were awake and on guard. From the left: Back row: Isaac Malherbe (40), Lammie de Villiers (23), Jac Retief, Jan Malherbe, (37) brother of Isaac, Kenne Malherbe (27) lawyer, Hennie Malherbe (32) brother of Isaak, lawyer, Joubert Reitz (behind) (18), Denys Reitz (17), D. de Villiers, Flip Tulleken, Johan Retief. Middle row: Charlie Jeppe (29), Dawie Malherbe (33), Wallie de Vos (28), Paultjie de Villiers, Gert Coetzee, Johnnie de Villiers (28). Front: J. Solms, B. van Rensburg, Sampie van Zyl (30), J. Rattray,.Jan Luttig (39).

49. The fight in the donga

Reitz said that at about 1 o’clock they heard the English on top of the hill crying ‘Hurrah!’ They sent word to Zeederberg, the Field Cornet, who soon arrived at the Malherbe picquet with some burghers of the Pretoria Commando but after the gun had been blown up. Reitz and his companions heard “the crash of musketry followed by wild bursts of cheering”. It was then that Malherbe shouted “Come on boys” and he and eight members of the
corporalship ran towards the sound of the firing. The nine were Isaac Malherbe, Hennie, Jan and Kenne Malherbe, Pauljie and Arthur de Villiers, Sampie van Zijl and Joubert and Deneys Reitz. Zeederberg and the remainder of the corporalship returned to the laager and took up positions on Bell’s Kop. Five or six men of the commando did not obey Zeederberg’s command and came after Malherbe’s men a little later. Among them were Désiré de Villiers, Johnny Niemeyer and Harry Spanier, a man called Solms and John Pott.

50. Lieutenant Gilbert Fergusson

Those Boers who had been on guard at the gun emplacement returned to their posts once they realized that the Riflemen had vacated the position. These men fired down the slope at the retiring Riflemen. Gough had to prevent some of his men charging back up the hill at the Boers. His diary contains the statement that he “never was in such a hot place in his life.” There was confused fighting in the bush when the Boers picked up some of the Riflemen’s calls, “’A’ Company over here” and so on. Lieutenant Gilbert Fergusson was killed near the foot of the hill.